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The research university plays an important role as a source of fundamental knowledge and, 
occasionally, industrially relevant technology in modern knowledge-based economies.  In 
recognition of this fact, governments throughout the industrialized world have launched 
numerous initiatives since the 1970s to link universities to industrial innovation more closely.  
Many of these initiatives seek to spur local economic development based on university research, 
e.g., by creating “science parks” located nearby research university campuses, support for 
“business incubators” and public “seed capital” funds, and the organization of other forms of 
“bridging institutions” that are believed to link universities to industrial innovation. Other efforts 
are modeled on a U.S. law, the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, that is widely (if perhaps incorrectly) 
credited with improving university-industry collaboration and technology transfer in the U.S. 
national innovation system.   
This chapter examines the roles of universities in industrial-economy national innovation 
systems, the complex institutional landscapes that influence the creation, development, and 
dissemination of innovations (See Edquist’s chapter in this volume for further discussion).  The 
inclusion of a chapter on university research in a volume on innovation is itself an innovation—it 
is likely that a similar handbook published two decades ago would have devoted far less attention 
to the role of universities in industrial innovation. i  But scholarship on the role of universities in 
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the innovation process, as opposed to their role in basic research, has grown rapidly since 1970.  
One important theme in this research is the re-conceptualization of universities as important 
institutional actors in national and regional systems of innovation.  Rather than “ivory towers” 
devoted to the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, a growing number of industrial-economy 
and developing-economy governments seek to use universities as instruments for knowledge-
based economic development and change. 
 Governments have sought to increase the rate of transfer of academic research advances 
to industry and to facilitate the application of these research advances by domestic firms since the 
1970s as part of broader efforts to improve national economic performance.  In the “knowledge-
based economy,” according to this view, national systems of higher education can be a strategic 
asset, if links with industry are strengthened and the transfer of technology enhanced and 
accelerated.  Many if not most of these “technology-transfer” initiatives focus on the codification 
of property rights to individual inventions, and rarely address the broader matrix of industry-
university relationships that span a broad range of activities and outputs. 
Universities throughout the OECD also have been affected by tighter constraints on 
public funding since 1970. Growth in public funding for higher education has slowed in a number 
of OECD member states.  In the United States, Cohen et al. (1998) note that federal research 
funding per full-time academic researcher declined by 9.4% in real terms during 1979-91, in the 
face of significant upward pressure on the costs of conducting state-of-the-art research in many 
fields of the physical sciences and engineering.  Financial support from state governments for 
U.S. public universities’ operating budgets (which obviously include more than research) 
declined from nearly 46% of total revenues in 1980 to slightly more than 40% in 1991 (Slaughter 
and Leslie, 1997, Table 3.2), while the share of federal funds in U.S. public university operating 
budgets declined from 12.8% to 10% during the same period (the share of operating revenues 
derived from tuition and fees rose from 12.9% to 15%).  The UK government reduced its 
institutional funding of universities (as opposed to targeted, competitive programs for research) 
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during the 1980s and 1990s, as did the government of Australia (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997).   
Faced with slower growth in overall public funding, increased competition for research 
funding, and continuing cost pressures within their operating budgets during the past two 
decades, at least some universities have become more aggressive and “entrepreneurial” in seeking 
new sources of funding.  University presidents and vice-chancellors have promoted the regional 
and national economic benefits flowing from academic research and have sought closer links with 
industry as a means of expanding research support.   
Both internal and external factors thus have led many nations’ universities to promote 
stronger linkages with industry as a means of publicizing and/or strengthening their contributions 
to innovation and economic growth.  In some cases, these initiatives build on long histories of 
collaboration between university and industry researchers that reflect unique structural features of 
national university systems and their industrial environment.  In other cases, however, these 
initiatives are based on a misunderstanding of the roles played by universities in national 
innovation systems, as well as the factors that underpin their contributions to industria l 
innovation.   
Although universities fulfill broadly similar functions in the innovation systems of most 
industrial and industrializing economies, the importance of their role varies considerably, and is 
influenced by the structure of domestic industry, the size and structure of other publicly funded 
research performers, and numerous factors.  Following a discussion of the (limited) evidence on 
the contrasting importance of universities within R&D performance and employment in national 
innovation systems, we examine other evidence on the contributions of universities to industrial 
innovation.  Based on this discussion, we critically examine recent initiatives by governments in a 
number of OECD nations to enhance the contributions of universities to innovation and economic 
growth.  We conclude with a discussion of the broad agenda for future research. 
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II. What functions do universities perform within national 
innovation systems? 
In varying degrees universities throughout the OECD now combine the functions of 
education and research.  This joint production of trained personnel and advanced research may be 
more effective than specialization in one or the other activity. ii   For example, the movement of 
trained personnel into industrial and other occupations can be as a powerful mechanism for the 
diffusion of scientific research, and demands from students and their prospective employers for 
“relevance” in the curriculum can strengthen links between the academic research agenda and the 
needs of society. 
The economically important "outputs" of university research have come in different forms, 
varying over time and across industries.iii They include, among others: scientific and 
technological information iv (which can increase the efficiency of applied R&D in industry by 
guiding research towards more fruitful departures), equipment and instrumentationv (used by 
firms in their production processes or their research), skills or human capital (embodied in 
students and faculty members), networks of scientific and technological capabilities (which 
facilitate the diffusion of new knowledge), and prototypes for new products and processes.vi 
Universities are widely cited as a critical institutional actor in national innovation systems 
(see Nelson, 1993; Edquist, this volume, and numerous other works).  As Edquist notes in his 
chapter, the precise definition of “national innovation systems” remains somewhat hazy, but most 
of the large literature on the topic defines them as the institutions and actors that affect the 
creation, development, and diffusion of innovations.  The literature on national innovation 
systems emphasizes the importance of strong linkages among these various institutions in 
improving national innovative and competitive performance, and this emphasis applies in 
particular to universities within national innovation systems.vii  The “national” innovation systems 
of the industrial economies appear more and more interdependent, reflecting rapid growth during 
the post-1945 period in cross-border flows of capital, goods, people, and knowledge.  Yet the 
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university systems of these economies retain strong “national” characteristics, reflecting 
significant contrasts among national university systems in structure and the influence of historical 
evolution on contemporary structure and policy. 
One influential conceptualization of the role of academic research within national innovation 
systems and economies was the so-called “linear model” of innovation widely associated with 
Vannevar Bush and his famous “blueprint” for the U.S. post-1945 R&D system, Science:  The 
Endless Frontier.  Bush argued for expanded public funding for basic research within U.S. 
universities as a critical contributor to economic growth, and argued that universities were the 
most appropriate institutional locus for basic research.  This “linear model” of the innovation 
process asserted that funding of basic research was both necessary and sufficient to promote 
innovation.  Bush’s argument anticipated parts of the "market failure" rationale for the funding of 
basic academic research subsequently developed by Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962).  This 
portrayal of the innovation process has been widely criticized (see Kline and Rosenberg, 1986, 
for one such rebuttal of the linear model). Many U.S. policymakers during the 1970s and 1980s 
cited the Japanese economy as evidence that basic research may not be necessary or sufficient for 
a nation to improve its innovative performance.   
Yet another view of the role of university research focuses on the contrasting “norms” of 
academic and industrial research.  Merely contrasting the “fundamental” research activities of 
academics with the applied research of industrial scientists and engineers obscures as much as it 
illuminates—after all, there are abundant examples of university researchers making important 
contributions to technology development, as well as numerous cases of important basic research 
advances in industrial laboratories.  Paul David and colleagues (Dasgupta and David, 1987; 
David, Foray, and Steinmueller, 1999) argue that the norms of academic research differ 
significantly from those observed within industry.  For academic researchers, professional 
recognition and advancement depend crucially on being first to disclose and publish their result.  
Prompt disclosure of results and in most cases, the methods used to achieve them, therefore is 
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central to academic research.  Industrial innovation, by contrast, relies more heavily on secrecy 
and limitations to the disclosure of research results.  The significance of these “cultural 
differences” for the conduct and dissemination of research may assume greater significance in the 
face of closer links between university and industrial researchers (see below). 
But these contrasts also can be overstated, as David et al. (1999) acknowledge.  The history 
of science is replete with examples of fierce competitions (“discovery races”) between teams of 
researchers in a given field that systematically seek to mislead one another through the disclosure 
of false information.  And recent research by Henderson and colleagues (Henderson, Pisano, and 
Orsenigo, 1999; Henderson and Cockburn, 1998) on pharmaceutical industry R&D highlights the 
increased emphasis by a number of large pharmaceutical firms on publication by industrial 
researchers as a means of improving their basic science capabilities.  Nevertheless, the potential 
for clashes between the disclosure norms of academia and industry, and in particular, the potential 
risks posed by more restrictive disclosure norms for the educational functions and the broader 
pace of advance in scientific understanding, remains significant.  
Still another conceptual framework that has been applied recently to descriptions of the role 
of academic research in “post-modern” industrial societies is the “Mode 2” concept of research 
identified with Michael Gibbons and colleagues (Gibbons et al., 1994).  “Mode 2” research is 
associated with a more interdisciplinary, pluralistic, “networked” innovation system, in contrast 
to the previous system in which major corporate or academic research institutions were less 
closely linked with other institutions.  Gibbons and other scholars argue that the growth of “Mode 
2” research reflects the increased scale and diversity of knowledge inputs required for scientific 
research, a point echoed in the chapter by Pavitt  in this volume.  Increased diversity in inputs, in 
this view, is associated with greater interinstitutional collaboration and more interdisciplinary 
research.  Because “Mode 2” involves the interaction of many more communities of researchers 
and other actors within any given research area, purely academic research norms may prove less 
influential even in such areas of fundamental research as biomedical research.   
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The “Mode 2” framework assuredly is consistent with some characteristics of modern 
innovation systems, notably the increased interinstitutional collaboration that has been remarked 
upon by numerous scholars.  But this framework’s claims that the sources of knowledge within 
modern innovation systems have become more diverse need not imply any decline in the role of 
universities as fundamental research centers.  Several studies (Godin and Gingras, 2000; Hicks 
and Hamilton, 1999; see below for further discussion) support the “Mode 2” assertion that that 
cross-institutional collaboration and diversification in knowledge sources have grown, but 
indicate no such decline.    
Still another conceptual framework for analyzing the changing position of universities within 
national innovation systems is the “Triple Helix” popularized by Etzkowitz and Leytesdorff 
(1997).  Like the “Mode 2” framework, the triple helix emphasizes the increased interaction 
among these institutional actors in industrial economies’ innovation systems.   Etzkowitz and co-
authors (Etzkowitz et al. 1998) further assert that 
In addition to linkages among institutional spheres, each sphere takes the role of the other.  
Thus, universities assume entrepreneurial tasks such as marketing knowledge and creating 
companies even as firms take on an academic dimension, sharing knowledge among each 
other and training at ever-higher skill levels. (p. 6).  
 
The “triple helix” scholarship devotes little attention to the “transformations” in industry and 
government that are asserted to complement those in universities.  The helix’s emphasis on a 
more “industrial” role for universities may be valid, although it overstates the extent to which 
these “industrial” activities are occurring throughout universities, rather than in a few fields of 
academic research.  But the “triple helix” has yet to yield major empirical or research advances, 
and its value as a guide for future empirical research appears to be limited. 
 The “national systems,” “Mode 2,” and “triple helix” frameworks for conceptualizing the 
role of the research university within the innovation processes of knowledge-based economies 
emphasize the importance of strong links between universities and other institutional actors in 
these economies.  And both “Mode 2” and the “Triple Helix”argue that interactions between 
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universities and industry, in particular, have grown.  According to the “Triple Helix” framework, 
increased interactions are associated with change in the internal culture and norms of universities 
(as noted, this framework has much less to say about the change in the characteristics of industrial 
and governmental research institutions).    What is lacking in all of these frameworks, however, is 
a clear set of criteria by which to assess the strength of such linkages and a set of indicators to 
guide the collection of data.    
III. The role of universities in national innovation systems:  
cross-national data  
 
A. Comparative data on the structure of national systems    
 The first universities appeared during the Middle Ages in Bologna and Paris, and were 
autonomous, self-governing institutions recognized by both church and local governmental 
authorities.viii  This situation persisted through much of the period prior to the 18th century.  But 
the rise of the modern state was associated with the assertion by governments of greater control 
over public university systems in much of Continental Europe, notably France and Germany, as 
well as Japan.ix  Such centralized control was lacking, however, in the British and especially, the 
U.S. higher education systems throughout the 19th and 20th centuries.  Throughout the 20th 
century, U.S. universities retained great autonomy in their administrative policies.  Rosenberg 
(1999) and Ben-David (1968) argue that this lack of central control forced American universities 
to be more "entrepreneurial" and their research and curricula to be more responsive to changing 
socio-economic demands than their European counterparts.  Data allowing for systematic cross-
national comparisons of the structure of the higher educational systems of major industrial 
economies are surprisingly scarce.   
This section summarizes and assesses the limited comparative data on the training and 
research roles of higher educational systems, as well as their relationships with industry.  
Enrollment data (summarized in Geiger, 1986, and Graham and Diamond, 1997) indicate that the 
U.S. system enrolled a larger fraction of the 18-22 year old population than those of any 
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European nations throughout the 1900-1945 period.  Not until the 1960s did European enrollment 
rates exceed 10% of the relevant age cohorts, by which time U.S. enrollment rates within this 
group were reaching 50% (Burn et al., 1971).  These contrasts in enrollment rates are reflected in 
enduring differences between the United States and European nations in the shares of their 
populations with university education.   The share of the U.S. population with university or 
“tertiary” educational degrees exceeded that of any other OECD economy as late as 1999.   
These data also reveal that the U.S. university degreeholder share is followed closely by that 
of Norway, at 25% (OECD Education Database, 2001).  Surprisingly, Austria, with 6% of the 
relevant population holding university or tertiary degrees, exhibits the lowest degreeholder share 
in this database.  As Fagerberg and Godinho note in their chapter in this volume, however, the 
large output of university degreeholders in the United States includes a significantly smaller share 
of natural science and engineering degreeholders than is true of such other nations as the United 
Kingdom, Singapore, Finland, South Korea, and France.  The share of 24-year-olds in the United 
States with “first degrees” from universities in natural sciences and engineering also lags well 
behind these and other nations.x   
The limited data on the role of national higher education systems as R&D performers 
highlight other cross-national contrasts, including differences in their significance within the 
overall national R&D enterprise, their scale, their roles as employers of researchers, and their 
relationships with industry.  As Figure 1 shows, the role of universities as R&D performers 
(measured in terms of the share of national R&D performed within higher education) is greatest 
in Italy, the Netherlands, and Canada, all of which show universities performing more than 25% 
of total national R&D by 1998-2000 (Figure 1).  The share of national R&D performance 
accounted for by U.S. and Japanese universities, by contrast, was slightly more than 14% during 
the same period.   
FIGURE 1 HERE 
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 Cross-national data highlighting differences in the “division of labor” between 
universities and government laboratories in basic research indicate that the higher education 
sector’s share of basic research performance is similar in most Western European economies and 
the United States, although higher than in most of the Eastern European and Asian countries for 
which data are available (OECD 2001b, Annex Table A.6.4.1). But a key difference between the 
United States and most European countries for which data are available is that a relatively low 
share of basic research outside the academic sector in the United States is performed by the 
government, and a relatively high share by industry.  xi   
The data also reveal considerable variation among OECD member nations in the scale of the 
higher-education research enterprise.  Although the U.S. higher education system is larger in 
absolute terms than those of other OECD member states, U.S. universities’ performance of R&D 
in fact accounts for a smaller share of GDP than is true of Sweden, France, Canada, the 
Netherlands, and Norway (Figure 2).  Indeed, Figure 2 indicates that U.S. universities’ R&D as a 
share of GDP has in fact declined slightly during the 1989-1999 period.  At least a portion of this 
decline reflects the rapid growth in industrially funded R&D performed within U.S. industry, 
especially during the 1995-99 period. 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
Comparison of the share of “employed researchers” in various nations’ R&D systems that 
work in universities reveals that the United States and Japan rank very low, reflecting the fact that 
a much higher share of researchers in both nations are employed by industry rather than higher 
education.  In 1997, the last year for which reasonably complete data are available, 82.5% of 
researchers were employed by industry in the United States (OECD 2001c, Table 39), 
significantly higher than in any other OECD nation.  Korea ranks second (68.1%) and Japan third 
(64.6%), while the overall average for EU countries is much lower (48.4%).  
Figure 3 depicts the share of R&D funding within national higher education systems that is 
provided by industry.  Despite the widely remarked closeness of U.S. university-industry research 
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ties and collaboration (see Rosenberg and Nelson, 1994; Mowery et al., forthcoming) , the share 
of R&D in higher education that is financed by industry is higher for Canada, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom than for the United States in the late 20th century. 
  FIGURE 3 HERE 
Other qualitative data from the OECD 2002 study of “science-industry relationships” (2002, 
p. 37) compare the labor mobility and other “network relationships” linking universities and 
industry for Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Sweden, the UK, the US, and 
Japan.  “R&D consulting with firms by university researchers” is greater than the EU average (the 
basis for these characterizations is not provided by the OECD study) in Austria, Germany, the 
UK, US, and Japan; such consulting is rated as “low” in Belgium, Finland, Ireland, and Italy.  
The annual flow of university researchers to industrial employment, another potentially important 
channel for knowledge exchange, is significantly higher than the EU average in Belgium, 
Finland, Germany, Sweden, the UK, and the United States.  Finally, the “significance of 
networks” linking universities and industry is rated as above the EU average for Finland, 
Germany, Sweden, the UK, the US, and Japan. 
Surprisingly, in view of the frequency with which the United States is cited approvingly for 
the close links between university and industrial researchers, the evidence that university-industry 
relationships are “stronger” in the U.S. than elsewhere is mixed: the qualitative data on labor 
mobility support this characterization, while the data on industrial support of academic research 
do not.  An important gap in research on the role of universities in national innovation systems 
and a corresponding research opportunity is the development of better quantitative measures or 
indicators of the scope and importance of this role.  If the stereotypical view of U.S. universities 
as more closely linked with industrial research and innovation is indeed valid (and we believe that 
it is), it is striking that the available indicators shed so little light on the dimensions of these 
closer links.   
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Although universities serve similar functions in most industrial economies, these indicators 
suggest that their importance in training scientists and engineers and in research performance 
differs considerably among OECD member nations.  These differences reflect cross-national 
differences in industry structure, especially the importance of such “high-technology” industries 
as electronics or information technology that are highly research-intensive and (at least since the 
end of the Cold War) rely heavily on private-sector sources for R&D finance.  In addition, of 
course, the role of nonuniversity public research institutions differs among these economies, and 
is reflected in the contrasts in universities as performers of publicly funded R&D.  These 
structural contrasts are the result of a lengthy, path-dependent process of historical development, 
in which institutional evolution interacts with industrial growth and change.   
B.   Recent trends in university-industry linkages  
 
Although comparative cross-sectional data reveal substantial differences in the sources of 
funding and other characteristics of the national systems of higher education among OECD 
member states, longitudinal data reveal an increase in co-authorship between university and 
industry researchers in many of these nations. Among other things, this evidence on increased co-
authorship may indicate some growth, rather than decline, in the role of universities as centers for 
knowledge production within national innovation systems, the arguments of the “Mode 2” model 
notwithstanding.  A recent paper by Calvert and Patel (2002) based on an examination of slightly 
more than 22,000 papers reveals a threefold increase in co-authorship between UK industry and 
university researchers during 1981-2000.  Papers co-authored by industrial and university 
researchers expanded from approximately 20% to nearly 47% of all UK scientific papers 
published by industrial researchers during the 1981-2000 period.  The share of papers with UK 
university authors that were co-authored by industrial and university scientists also grew during 
this period, from 2.8% in the early 1980s to 4.5% in 2000. xii  Co-authored papers in computer 
science grew by more than eightfold, although the fields of chemistry, medicine, and bio logy 
accounted for the largest shares of co-authored papers (respectively, 20%, 20%, and 14%).   
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Calvert and Patel found that the 1981/85 – 1986/90 period was characterized by the most 
rapid growth in such co-authorship.  This finding is particularly interesting since the 1980s were 
characterized by cuts in UK central government spending on higher education, and the 1990s 
were a period of more aggressive governmental promotion of university-industry collaboration 
and technology transfer.  In other words, the growth in co-authorship measured by these scholars 
appears to have occurred without any specific encouragement (beyond funding cuts) from 
government policy.  The UK universities responsible for the majority of the co-authored papers 
were among the most distinguished research universities in Great Britain.   
Another study of co-authorship between university and industry researchers is that by Hicks 
et al. (1996), which compares trends during the 1980-89 period in co-authorship in Japan and 
Western Europe.  Overall co-authorship rates (covering all industrial sectors and including both 
domestic and foreign universities) were similar (roughly 20% for European papers and slightly 
less for Japanese papers) for Western Europe and Japan in 1980.  By 1989, however, co-
authorship rates for Western Europe had risen to nearly 40% of published papers, while Japanese 
co-authorship rates only slightly exceeded 20%.  
There is surprisingly little empirical work on co-authorship in the United States. A study by 
Hicks and Hamilton (1999) reports that between 1981 and 1994, the number of U.S. papers co-
authored by university and industry researchers more than doubled, considerably exceeding the 
38% increase in the total number of scientific papers published by U.S. researchers during this 
period. The authors also suggest that these co-authored papers are less “basic” than academic 
articles without industrial co-authors.   
Overall, these bibliometric studies present a rich descriptive and a relatively weak 
explanatory analysis of an important type of university-industry collaboration, inasmuch as they 
provide little explanation for trends or cross-national differences.  Nonetheless, these data 
highlight a broad trend of growth in such co-authorship, and this area remains a very fruitful one 
for future research that spans more fields, nations, and types of publications.   The results of the 
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bibliometric work in this area provide some support for the “Mode 2” and “Triple Helix” 
frameworks’ arguments that research collaboration between universities and industry is growing 
throughout the industrial economies, in university systems with very different structures (see the 
chapter by Edquist in this volume, as well as the studies in Laredo and Mustar, 2001). 
IV. How does university research affect industrial innovation?  A 
summary of some U.S. studies 
 
The quantitative indicators discussed in the previous section provide some information on 
the structure of universities within the OECD and their links with national innovation systems.  
But these data shed very little light on the characteristics of the knowledge flows between 
university research and the industrial innovation process.  This issue is especially important in 
light of the numerous government policy initiatives that seek to enhance or exploit such 
knowledge flows (see below).  Although their coverage is limited to U.S. universities and 
industry, a number of recent studies based on interviews or surveys of senior industrial managers 
in industries ranging from pharmaceuticals to electrical equipment have examined the influence 
of university research on industrial innovation, and thereby provide additional insight into the role 
of universities within the U.S. national innovation system.  
All of these studies (GUIRR, 1991; Mansfield, 1991; Levin et al., 1987; Cohen, Nelson, & 
Walsh, 2002) emphasize the significance of interindustry differences in the relationship between 
university and industrial innovation.  The biomedical sector, especially biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals, is unusual, in that university research advances affect industrial innovation more 
significantly and directly in this field than is true of other sectors. In these other technological and 
industrial fields, universities occasionally contributed relevant “inventions,” but most 
commercially significant inventions came from nonacademic research.  The incremental advances 
that were the primary focus of the R&D activities of firms in these sectors were almost 
exclusively the domain of industrial research, design, problem-solving, and development. 
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University research contributed to technological advances by enhancing knowledge of the 
fundamental physics and chemistry underlying manufacturing processes and product innovation, 
an area in which training of scientists and engineers figured prominently, and experimental 
techniques.  
The studies by Levin et al. (1987) and Cohen et al. (2002) summarize industrial R&D 
managers’ views on the relevance to industrial innovation of various fields of university research 
(Table 1 summarizes the results discussed in Levin et al., 1987).  Virtually all of the fields of 
university research that were rated as “important” or “very important” for their innovative 
activities by survey respondents in both studies were related to engineering or applied sciences.  
As we noted previously in this chapter, these fields of U.S. university research frequently 
developed in close collaboration with industry. Interestingly, with the exception of chemistry, 
TABLE 1 HERE 
very few basic sciences appear on the list of university research fields deemed by industry 
respondents to be relevant to their innovative activities.   
The absence of fields such as physics and mathematics in Table 1, however, should not 
interpreted as indicating that academic research in these fields does not contribute directly to 
technical advance in industry.  Instead, these results reflect the fact that the effects on industrial 
innovation of basic research findings in such areas as physics, mathematics, and the physical 
sciences are realized only after a considerable lag.  Moreover, application of academic research 
results may require that these advances be incorporated into the applied sciences, such as 
chemical engineering, electrical engineering and material sciences.  The survey results 
summarized in Cohen et al. (2002) indicate that in most industries, university research results 
play little if any role in triggering new industrial R&D projects; instead, the stimuli originate with 
customers or from manufacturing operations.  Here as elsewhere, pharmaceuticals is an 
exception, since university research results in this field often trigger industrial R&D projects.   
Cohen et al. (2002) further report that the results of “public research” performed in 
 16 
government labs or universities were used more frequently by U.S. industrial firms (on average, 
in 29.3% of industrial R&D projects) than prototypes emerging from these external sources of 
research (used in an average of 8.3% of industrial R&D projects).  A similar portrait of the 
relative importance of different outputs of university and public -laboratory research emerges 
from the responses to questions about the importance to industrial R and D of various information 
channels (Table 2).  Although pharmaceuticals once again is unusual in its assignment of 
considerable importance to patents and license agreements involving universities and public 
laboratories, respondents from this industry still rated research publications and conferences as a 
more important source of information.  For most industries, patents and licenses involving 
inventions from university or public laboratories were reported to be of very little importance, 
compared with publications, conferences, informal interaction with university researchers, and 
consulting. 
TABLE 2 HERE 
Data on the use by industrial R&D managers of academic research results are needed for 
other industrial economies.  Nonetheless, the results of these U.S. studies consistently emphasize 
that the relationship between academic research and industrial innovation in the biomedical field 
differs from that in other knowledge-intensive sectors.  In addition, these studies suggest that 
academic research rarely produces “prototypes” of inventions for development and 
commercialization by industry—instead, academic research informs the methods and disciplines 
employed by firms in their R&D facilities.  Finally, the channels rated by industrial R&D 
managers as most important in this complex interaction between academic and industrial 
innovation rarely include patents and licenses.  Perhaps the most striking aspect of these survey 
and interview results is the fact that they have not informed the design of recent policy initiatives 
to enhance the contributions of university research to industrial innovation. 
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V. From “Science Push” to “Technology Commercialization” 
 As we suggested in Section I, since 1980 a number of industrialized countries have 
implemented or considered policies to strengthen “linkages” between universities (and public 
research organizations) and industry, in order to enhance the contributions of university-based 
research to innovation and economic performance. These initiatives all share the premise that 
universities support innovation in industry primarily through the production by universities of 
“deliverables” for commercialization (e.g., patented discoveries), despite the modest support for 
this premise in the research discussed above.  We illustrate these points in this section with case 
studies of two types of policies: (1) policies encouraging the formation of regional economic 
“clusters” and spin-offs based on university research, and (2) policies attempting to stimulate 
university patenting and licensing activities.  
The global diffusion of these “technology commercialization” policies illustrates a 
phenomenon that has received too little attention in the literature on innovation policy—the 
efforts by policymakers to “borrow” policy instruments from other economies and apply these 
instruments in a very different institutional context.  As Lundvall and Borras point out in their 
chapter, history, path dependence, and institutional “embeddedness” all make this type of 
“emulation” very difficult.  Nonetheless, such emulation has been especially widespread in the 
field of technology policy.  International policy emulation of this sort is characterized by two key 
features:  (1) the “learning” that underpins the emulation is highly selective; and (2) the 
implementation of program designs based on even this selective learning is affected by the 
different institutional landscape of the emulator.   
 
A. Universities and Regional Economic Development 
 In many OECD countries, efforts to increase the national economic returns from public 
investments in university research have attempted to stimulate the creation of “regional clusters” 
of innovative firms around universities.  These undertakings seek to stimulate regional economic 
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development and agglomeration via facilitating the creation of  “spin-off” firms to commercialize 
university technologies (OECD, 2002).xiii  
 These policy initiatives are motivated by the high-technology regional clusters in the 
United States, notably Silicon Valley in California and Route 128 in the Boston area.  Both of 
these high-technology clusters have a spawned a large number of new firms and have major 
research universities in their midst (in California, the University of California at Berkeley, 
Stanford University, and the University of California at San Francisco; in Boston, Harvard 
University and MIT).  At least some of the successful new firms in these regions have been 
involved in commercializing technologies developed at regional universities.  
 Other evidence (notably, Trajtenberg, Jaffe, and Henderson, 1997) suggests that the 
“knowledge spillovers” from university research within the United States, measured by the 
location of inventors citing university patents, tend to be localized at the regional level.  Recent 
work by Hicks et al. (2001) similarly indicates that patents filed by U.S. inventors 
disproportionately cite scientific papers from research institutions located in the same state as 
these inventors. 
But little evidence supports the argument that the presence of universities somehow 
“causes” the development of regional high-technology agglomerations.  And even less evidence 
supports the argument that the regional or innovation policies of governments are effective in 
creating these agglomerations.  One can point to high-technology clusters with highly productive 
research universities in a number of areas in the United States and other industrial economies; but 
there are also a number of research universities that have not spawned such agglomerations.  
Moreover, efforts to replicate the “Silicon Valley model” in other economies have proven 
difficult and the results of these efforts have been mixed (a fascinating historical account of the 
efforts by Frederick Terman of Stanford University to promote such “exports” may be found in 
Leslie and Kargon, 1996).   
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National and local governments in many OECD countries have attempted to stimula te the 
formation of these clusters via funding for “science parks” (occasionally also called incubators, 
technology centers, or centers of excellence.) Interestingly, there is considerable disagreement 
about exactly what a “science park” is and what they do; the International Association of Science 
Parks characterizes them as follows: 
A Science Park is an organisation managed by specialised professionals, whose main 
aim is to increase the wealth of its community by promoting the culture of innovation 
and the competitiveness of its associated businesses and knowledge-based institutions 
… To enable these goals to be met, a Science Park stimulates and manages the flow of 
knowledge and technology amongst universities, R&D institutions, companies and 
markets; it facilitates the creation and growth of innovation-based companies through 
incubation and spin-off processes; and provides other value-added services together 
with high quality space and facilities.  
(http://www.iaspworld.org/information/definitions.php).  
 
Despite the widespread interest in science parks, there is little evidence that they positively affect 
universities’ contributions to innovation or spur regional economic development. Using data on 
U.S. science parks, Felsenstein (1994) finds no evidence that firms located on university-based 
science parks are more innovative than other local firms, and Wallsten (2001) finds that science 
parks have a negative effect on regional economic development and rates of innovation. 
 The research on “science parks” in other industrial economies is also limited.  One 
examination of “science parks” in the UK (Massey et al., 1992) is dated, but presents interesting 
evidence on the characteristics of nearly 200 firms in 20 UK science parks.  The study found that 
startup firms represented 25-30% of the tenants in the science parks surveyed; in the absence of 
some kind of “control population,” it is difficult to reach conclusions about whether startup firms 
are over-represented or under-represented in these UK science parks.  Perhaps more surprising 
was the study’s finding that  
  
…formal research links between academic institutions and establishments on science 
parks were no more evident than similar links with firms located off-park…Formal 
research links such as “employment of academics,” “sponsoring trials or research,” 
“testing and analysis,” “student project” work and “graduate employment” were fairly 
 20 
similar for park firms and off-park firms.  However, significantly more park firms than 
off-park firms mentioned “informal contacts with academics” and the use of academic 
facilities such as computers, libraries or dining facilities as being important. (Massey et 
al., 1992, p. 38). 
 
This and other evidence on the results of government policies to promote university-
based regional agglomerations suggests that such policies have a mixed record of success.  And 
even successful regional agglomerations may require considerable time to emerge.  Recent work 
by Sturgeon (2000) argues that Silicon Valley’s history as a center for new-firm formation and 
innovation dates back to the early decades of the 20th century, suggesting that much of the 
region’s innovative “culture” developed over a much longer period of time and predates the 
ascent to global research eminence of Stanford University.  Similarly, the North Carolina 
“Research Triangle,” which was promoted much more aggressively by the state government, was 
established in the late 1950s and became a center for new-firm formation and innovation only in 
the late 1980s.   
Still other work on the development of Silicon Valley by Leslie (1993, 2000) and 
Saxenian (1988) emphasizes the massive increase in federal defense spending after 1945 as a 
catalyst for the formation of new high-technology firms in the region.  In this view, the presence 
of leading research universities may have been necessary, but was by no means sufficient, to 
create Silicon Valley during the 1950s and 1960s.  Saxenian in particular emphasizes the very 
different structure of British defense procurement policies in explaining the lack of similar 
dynamism in the Cambridge region.   
 The links between university research and the emergence of regional high-technology 
agglomerations thus are more complex than is implied by the correlation between the presence of 
high-technology firms and research universities in a number of locales.  The U.S. experience 
suggests that the emergence of such agglomerations is a matter of contingency, path-dependence, 
and (most importantly) the presence of other supporting policies (intentional or otherwise) that 
 21 
may have little to do with university research or the encouragement of university-industry 
linkages.   
The policy initiatives in the United States and other OECD economies that seek to use 
university research and “science parks” to stimulate regional economic development suffer from a 
deficiency that is common to many of the other recent efforts to stimulate university-industry 
linkages in OECD countries, i.e. a lack of attention to supporting institutions, a focus on “success 
stories” with little attention to systematic evidence on the casual effects of the policies, and a 
narrow focus on commercialization of university technologies, rather than other more 
economically important outputs of university research. These characteristics are also seen in 
recent efforts elsewhere within the OECD to emulate the Bayh-Dole Act.  
B. Patenting the results of publicly funded academic research 
As we noted above, this increased interest by governments in “Bayh-Dole- type” policies 
is rooted in motives similar to those underpinning policy initiatives that seek to create “high-
technology” regional clusters. But the “emulation” of Bayh-Dole in other industrial economies 
overlooks the importance and effects on university-industry collaboration and technology transfer 
of the many other institutions that support these interactions and the commercialization of 
university technologies in the United States.  In addition, these “emulation” initiatives are based 
on a misreading of the empirical evidence on the importance of intellectual property rights in 
facilitating the “transfer” and commercialization of university inventions, as well as a misreading 
of the evidence on the effects of the Bayh-Dole Act.   
1.   Origins of the Bayh-Dole Act 
Although some U.S. universities were patenting patent faculty inventions as early as the 
1920s, few institutions had developed formal patent policies prior to the late 1940s, and many of 
these policies embodied considerable ambivalence toward patenting.  Public universities were 
more heavily represented in patenting than private universities during the 1925-45 period, both 
within the top research universities and more generally.   
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These characteristics of university patenting began to change after 1970, as private 
universities expanded their share of U.S. university patenting, universities generally expanded 
their direct role in managing patenting and licensing, and the share of biomedical patents within 
overall university patenting increased.  Lobbying by U.S. research universities active in patenting 
was one of several factors behind the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980. 
 The Bayh-Dole Patent and Trademark Amendments Act of 1980 provided blanket 
permission for performers of federally funded research to file for patents on the results of such 
research and to grant licenses for these patents, including exclusive licenses, to other parties.  The 
Act facilitated university patenting and licensing in at least two ways.  First, it replaced a web of 
Institutional Patent Agreements (IPAs) that had been negotiated between individual universities and 
federal agencies with a uniform policy.  Second, the Act's provisions expressed Congressional 
support for the negotiation of exclusive licenses between universities and industrial firms for the 
results of federally funded research.   
The passage of the Bayh-Dole Act was one part of a broader shift in U.S. policy toward 
stronger intellectual property rights.xiv  Among the most important of these policy initiatives was 
the establishment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in 1982.  Established to 
serve as the court of final appeal for patent cases throughout the federal judiciary, the CAFC soon 
emerged as a strong champion of patentholder rights.  But even before the establishment of the 
CAFC, the 1980 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty upheld the validity of a 
broad patent in the new industry of biotechnology, facilitating the patenting and licensing of 
inventions in this sector.  
Rather than emphasizing public funding and relatively liberal disclosure and 
dissemination, the Bayh-Dole Act assumes that restrictions on dissemination of the results of 
many R&D projects will enhance economic efficiency by supporting their commercialization.  In 
many respects, the Bayh-Dole Act is the ultimate expression of faith in the “linear model” of 
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innovation—if basic research results can be purchased by would-be developers, commercial 
innovation will be accelerated.   
2. The Effects of Bayh-Dole 
How did the Bayh-Dole Act affect technology transfer by U.S. universities?   Figure 4 
depicts U.S. research university patenting as a share of domestically assigned U.S. patents during 
1963-99, in order to remove the effects of increased patenting in the United States by foreign 
firms and inventors during the late 20th century.  Universities increased their share of patenting 
from less than 0.3% in 1963 to nearly 4% by 1999, but the rate of growth in this share begins to 
accelerate before rather than after 1980.  The ratio of research university patents to academic 
research spending remains surprisingly constant through the 1963-93 period, suggesting no 
significant increase in universities’ “patent propensity” after passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 
1980.   
FIGURE 4 HERE 
Figure 5 displays trends during 1960-1999 in the distribution among technology classes 
of U.S. research university patents, highlighting the growing importance of biomedical patents in 
the patenting activities of the leading U.S. universities during the period. 
FIGURE 5 HERE 
Non-biomedical university patents increased by 90% from the 1968-70 period to the 1978-80 
period, but biomedical university patents increased by 295%.  The increased share of the 
biomedical disciplines within overall federal academic R&D funding, the dramatic advances in 
biomedical science that occurred during the 1960s and 1970s, and the strong industrial interest in 
the results of this biomedical research during this period all contributed to this shift in the 
composition of university patent portfolios. 
 During the late 1990s and early 21st century, many commentators and policymakers 
portrayed the Bayh-Dole Act as a critical catalyst to growth in U.S. universities’ innovative and 
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economic contributions.  Indeed, the OECD went so far as to argue that the Bayh-Dole Act was 
an important factor in the remarkable growth of incomes, employment, and productivity in the 
U.S. economy of the late 1990s.xv  Remarkably, virtually none of these characterizations of the 
positive effects of the Bayh-Dole Act cite any evidence in support of their claims beyond the 
clear growth in patenting and licensing by universities.   Nor does evidence of increased patenting 
and licensing by universities by itself indicate that university research discoveries are being 
transferred to industry more efficiently or commercialized more rapidly, as Colyvas et al. (2001) 
and Mowery et al. (2001) point out.  
These “assessments” of the effects of the Bayh-Dole Act also fail to consider any 
potentially negative effects of the Act on U.S. university research or innovation in the broader 
economy.  Some scholars have suggested that the “commercialization motives” created by Bayh-
Dole could shift the orientation of university research away from “basic” and towards “applied” 
research (Henderson et al., 1998), but thus far there is little evidence of substantial shifts since 
Bayh-Dole in the content of academic research.   
A second potentially negative effect of increased university patenting and licensing is the 
potential weakening of academic researchers’ commitments to “open science,” leading to 
publication delays, secrecy, and withholding of data and materials (Dasgupta and David, 1994; 
Liebeskind 2001). In view of the importance assigned by industrial researchers to the 
“nonpatent/licensing” channels of interaction with universities in most industrial sectors, it is 
crucially important that these channels not be constricted or impeded by the intensive focus on 
patenting and licensing in many universities.  The effects of any increased assertion by 
institutional and individual inventors of property rights over inputs to scientific research have 
only begun to receive serious scholarly attention.  Patenting and restrictive licensing of inputs 
into future research (“research tools”) could hinder downstream research and product 
development (Heller and Eisenberg 1998; Merges and Nelson 1994). 
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Although there is little evidence as yet that the Bayh-Dole Act has had significant, 
negative consequences for academic research, technology transfer, and industrial innovation in 
the United States, the data available to monitor any such effects are very limited.  Moreover, such 
data are necessarily retrospective, and in their nature are likely to reveal significant changes in the 
norms and behavior of researchers or universities only with a long lag.  Any negative effects of 
Bayh-Dole accordingly are likely to reveal themselves only well after they first appear.   
3. International “emulation” of the Bayh-Dole Act 
The limited evidence on the Act’s effects (both positive and negative) has not prevented a 
number of other OECD governments from pursuing policies that closely resemble the Bayh-Dole 
Act. Like the Bayh-Dole Act, these initiatives focus narrowly on the “deliverable” outputs of 
university research, and typically ignore the effects of patenting and licensing on the other, more 
economically important, channels through which universities contribute to innovation and 
economic growth.  Moreover, such emulation is based on a misreading of the limited evidence 
concerning the effects of Bayh-Dole and on a misunderstanding of the factors that have 
encouraged the long-standing and relatively close relationship between U.S. universities and 
industrial innovation. 
The policy initiatives that have been debated or implemented in most OECD economies have 
sought to shift ownership of the intellectual property rights for academic inventions to either the 
academic institution or the researcher (See OECD, 2002, for an excellent summary).  In some 
university systems, such as those of Germany or Sweden, researchers have long had ownership 
rights for the intellectual property resulting from their work, and debate has centered on the 
feasibility and advisability of shifting these ownership rights from the individual to the institution.  
In Italy, legislation adopted in 2001 shifted ownership from universities to individual researchers.  
In Japanese universities, ownership of intellectual property rights resulting from publicly funded 
research is determined by a committee, which on occasion awards title to the researcher.  No 
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single national policy governs IPR ownership within the British or Canadian university systems, 
although efforts are underway in both nations to grant ownership to the academic institution 
rather than the individual researcher or the funding agency.  In addition, the Swedish, German, 
and Japanese governments have encouraged the formation of external “technology licensing 
organizations,” which may or may not be affiliated with a given university. 
These policy proposals and initiatives display the classic signs of international emulation 
described above—selective “borrowing” from another nation’s policies for implementation in an 
institutional context that differs significantly from that of the nation being emulated. Inasmuch as 
patenting and licensing are of rated by industrial R&D managers as relatively unimportant for 
technology transfer in most fields, emulation of the Bayh-Dole Act is insufficient and perhaps 
even unnecessary to stimulate higher levels of university-industry interaction and technology 
transfer.  Instead, reforms to enhance inter-institutional competition and autonomy within 
national university systems, as well as support for the external institutional contributors to new-
firm formation and technology commercialization, appear to be more important.  Indeed, 
emulation of Bayh-Dole could be counterproductive in other industrial economies, precisely 
because of the importance of other channels for technology transfer and exploitation by industry.   
VI. Conclusion 
 Universities play important roles in the “knowledge-based” economies of modern 
industrial and industrializing states as sources of trained “knowledge workers” and ideas flowing 
from both basic and more applied research activities.  But conventional (and, perhaps, 
evolutionary) economic approaches to the analysis of institutions are very difficult to apply to 
universities, for several reasons.  First, with the exceptions of the U.S. and British university 
systems, inter-university “competition” has been limited in most national systems of higher 
education.  Inter-university competition was a very important historical influence on the evolution 
 27 
of U.S. universities and their links with industry; but this aspect of the “selection environment” is 
lacking in most other national systems of higher education.   
 Second, analyzing universities as economic institutions requires some definition of the 
objectives pursued by individual universities.  Partly because universities perform multiple roles 
in many national systems and partly because the internal structure of most research universities 
more closely resembles that of a cooperative organization rather than the hierarchical structure 
associated with industrial firms, characterizing “the objectives of the university” is difficult if not 
meaningless.  The modern university has its roots in the Middle Ages, rather than the Industrial 
Revolution, and its medieval origins continue to influence its organization and operation.  If 
universities are to be conceptualized as economic institutions for purposes of analyzing their 
evolution, the current analytic frameworks available in neoclassical or evolutionary economics 
are insufficient.   
The development of such an analytic  framework is important, not least for understanding 
the consequences for academic research of government policies that seek to accelerate the 
transfer of research results to industrial firms.  The intensified demands from governments to 
raise the (measurable) economic returns to their substantial investments in academic research and 
education makes the development of better tools for understanding and measuring the operations 
and outputs of universities all the more important.  As we argued above, many of the current 
initiatives in the United States and other industrial economies to enhance the economic returns 
from university research are based on a poor understanding of the full spectrum of roles fulfilled 
by research universities in industrial economies, as well as a tendency to emphasize the outputs of 
university research that can be easily quantified. 
Although the analytic frameworks provided by the “national innovation systems,” “Mode 
2,” and “Triple Helix” models of scientific research and innovation shed some light on the roles 
of universities and largely agree in their assessment of these roles, these frameworks provide 
limited guidance for policy or evaluation.  Moreover, these frameworks tend to downplay the 
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very real tensions among the different roles of research universities within knowledge-based 
economies.  Such tensions are likely to intensify in the face of pressure from policymakers and 
others on universities to accelerate their production and transfer to commercial interests of 
tangible, measurable research outputs. 
 The development of useful theoretical or conceptual tools or models for analyzing 
universities as economic or other institutions within knowledge-based economies is seriously 
hampered by the lack of data on the roles of universit ies that enable comparisons across time or 
across national innovation systems.  Indicators that enable longitudinal analysis of the roles of 
universities in training scientists and engineers, contributing to “public knowledge,” or 
transferring inventions to industrial firms are scarce if not entirely lacking for most national 
systems of higher education.  Few of these indicators incorporate information on the geographic 
dimensions of university-industry interactions, despite the importance of agglomeration 
economies in the current policy approaches of many governments in this area.  Moreover, such 
indicators as do exist rarely are comparable across national systems of higher education.   
The absence of broader longitudinal and cross-nationally comparable indicators of 
university-industry interaction thus impedes both the formulation and the evaluation of policies.  
And the lack of better indicators reflects the lack of a stronger analytic framework for 
understanding the roles of universities within national innovation systems.  Such a framework 
must adopt a more evolutionary, historically grounded approach to the understanding of the roles 
of universities, especially the influence of the structure of national higher education systems on 
these roles.  As we have argued in this chapter, many of the efforts by OECD governments to 
encourage technology transfer and to increase the economic payoffs to investments in university 
research are hampered by a lack of such understanding.  More comparative institutional work on 
the evolution and roles of research universities, including the contrasting “division of labor” 
among universities and other publicly supported research institutions in both industrial and 
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industrializing economies, is an indispensable starting point for analysis of the current and likely 
future position of the research university within national innovation systems. 
The development of better indicators of the full array of channels through which 
industries and universities interact within knowledge-based economies represents another 
important research opportunity.  In addition, more information is needed on measures of firm-
level “absorptive capacity” and investments in its creation and maintenance—how do existing 
firms develop these various channels of interaction?  How and why are new firms formed to 
exploit university research advances, and how does this “spinoff” process vary across time, 
geographic space, and national innovation systems?  The extensive discussion of all of these 
important economic phenomena still lacks a strong evidentiary basis for making comparisons 
among the higher education systems of the industrialized economies.  The current emphasis on 
the countable rather than the important aspects of university-industry interactions could have 
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# of Industries with 
“relevance” scores  
Selected industries for which 
the reported “relevance” of 
university research was large 
(> 6). 
 > 5 > 6  
    
Biology 12 3 Animal feed, drugs, 
processed fruits/vegetables 
Chemistry 19 3 Animal feed, meat products, 
drugs 
Geology 0 0 None 
Mathematics 5 1 Optical instruments 
Physics 4 2 Optical instruments, 
electronics? 
Agricultural science 17 7 Pesticides, animal feed, 
fertilizers, food products 
Applied math/operations research 16 2 Meat products, 
logging/sawmills 
Computer science 34 10 Optical instruments, 
logging/sawmills, paper 
machinery 
Materials science 29 8 Synthetic rubber, nonferrous 
metals 
Medical science 7 3 Surgical/medical 
instruments, drugs, coffee 
Metallurgy 21 6 Nonferrous metals, 
fabricated metal products 
Chemical engineering 19 6 Canned foods, fertilizers, 
malt beverages 
Electrical engineering 22 2 Semiconductors, scientific 
instruments 




Source:  Previously unpublished data from the Yale Survey on Appropriability and 
Technological Opportunity in Industry.  For a description of the survey, see Levin et al. 
(1987). 
 





Table 2:  Importance to Industrial R&D of Sources of Information on Public R&D 
(including university research) 
Information source % rating it as “very important” for 
industrial R&D 
  
Publications & reports 41.2% 
Informal Interaction 35.6 
Meetings & conferences 35.1 
Consulting 31.8 
Contract research 20.9 
Recent hires  19.6 
Cooperative R&D projects 17.9 
Patents 17.5 
Licenses 9.5 
Personnel exchange 5.8 
 
Source:  Cohen et al. (2002). 
                                                 
i   Godin and Gingras (2001) note that “After having been left out of major government policies centered on 
industrial innovation, universities seem, over the past 5 years, to have become the object of a renewed 
interest among students of the system of knowledge production.”  (p. 273). 
ii Mowery and Rosenberg (1989) note that the conduct of scientific research and education within many 
research universities “…exploits a great complementarity between research and teaching.  Under the 
appropriate set of circumstances, each may be performed better when they are done together.” (p. 154). 
iii This list draws from Rosenberg (1999), Cohen et al. (1998), and other sources.  
iv David, Mowery, and Steinmueller (1992) and Nelson (1982) discuss the economic importance of the 
“informational” outputs of university research.   
v See Rosenberg’s (1994) discussion of universities as a source of innovation in scientific instruments.  
vi See Rosenberg (1999). 
viiThus, Nelson’s concluding chapter in his 1993 collection of studies of national innovation systems argues 
that  “One important feature distinguishing countries that were sustaining competitive and innovative firms 
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was education and training systems that provide these firms with a flow of people with the requisite 
knowledge and skills.  For industries in which university-trained engineers and scientists were needed, this 
does not simply mean that the universities provide training in these fields, but also that they consciously 
train their students with an eye to industry needs.” (1993, p. 511).   
viii   According to Ben-David (1971), “To create order among the turbulent crowds of scholars and to 
regulate their relationships with the environing society, corporations were established.  Students and 
scholars were formed into corporations authorized by the church and recognized by the secular ruler.  The 
relationships of their corporation with that of the townspeople, with the local ecclesiastical officials, and 
with the king were carefully laid down and safeguarded by solemn oaths….The important result of this 
corporate device—which was not entirely unique to Europe but which attained a much greater importance 
there than elsewhere—was that advanced studies ceased to be conducted in isolated circles of masters and 
students.  Masters and/or students came to form a collective body.  The European student of the thirteenth 
century no longer went to study with a particular master but at a particular university. (p. 48). 
ix  The Japanese higher education system has a large number of private universities, although the bulk of 
these are devoted primarily to undergraduate education. 
x U.S. “science and engineering” degreeholders also account for a smaller share of all advanced degrees 
awarded in the United States in 1999 than is true of France, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom, although this 
share in the United States exceeded those for Finland and South Korea (National Science Foundation, 
2002).   
xi These data must be interpreted with caution, since the definitions used by the national statistical agencies 
whence they are drawn often differ.  For example, in France CNRS is classified as part of the Higher 
Education Sector, whereas in Italy similar organizations are treated as part of the government sector. See 
OECD 2001b, Annex 2 
xii By comparison, the share of US university publications co-authored by industrial and university 
researchers grew from 4.9% in 1989 to 7.3% in 1999, while this share in Canadian university publications 
grew from 1.4% in 1980 to 3.5% in 1998. 
xiii A recent OECD report notes that ”Spinning off is the entrepreneurial route to commercializing 
knowledge developed by public research and as such is attracting a great deal of attention, given the ’start-
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up’ fever in many countries” and that governments “have a special interest in this specific type of industry-
science linkage because it may be one of the factors that explain differences in performance in new-fast 
growing science based industries” (OECD, 2002, p. 41). 
xiv According to Katz and Ordover (1990), at least 14 Congressional bills passed during the 1980s focused on 
strengthening domestic and international protection for intellectual property rights, and the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit created in 1982 has upheld patent rights in roughly 80% of the cases argued before it, a 
considerable increase from the pre-1982 rate of 30% for the Federal bench. 
xv “Regulatory reform in the United States in the early 1980s, such as the Bayh-Dole Act, have [sic] 
significantly increased the contribution of scientific institutions to innovation.  There is evidence that this is 
one of the factors contributing to the pick-up of US growth performance…”  (OECD 2000, p. 77). 
